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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic model of takeovers based on the stock market
valuations of merging ﬁrms. The model incorporates competition and imperfect
information and determines the terms and timing of takeovers by solving option
exercise games between bidding and target shareholders. The implications of
the model for returns to stockholders are consistent with the available evidence.
Notably, the model predicts that (1) returns to target shareholders should be
larger than returns to bidding shareholders, and (2) returns to bidding share-
holders can be negative if there is competition for the acquisition of the target.
In addition, the model generates new predictions relating these returns to the
drift, volatility and correlation coeﬃcient of the bidder and the target stock
returns and to the dispersion of beliefs regarding the beneﬁts of the takeover.
K e y w o r d s :t a k e o v e r s ;r e a lo p t i o n s ;c o m p e t i t i o n ;l e a r n i n g .
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: G13, G34.
Forthcoming: Journal of Financial Economics
∗This paper builds on a previous paper titled “A Dynamic Analysis of Takeover Deals with
Competition and Imperfect Information”. We thank Mike Barclay, Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden,
and the associate editor for helpful comments. We also thank the referee for providing detailled
comments and suggesting the solution method to the equilibrium with competition. The ﬁrst author
acknowledges ﬁnancial support from NCCR FINRISK.
†Corresponding author: University of Lausanne, University of Rochester, and FAME. E-mail:
erwan.morellec@hec.unil.ch. Postal: Ecole des HEC, University of Lausanne, Route de Chavannes
33, 1007 Lausanne, Switzerland. Phone: +41 (0)21 692 3357.
‡University of Rochester. E-mail: zhdavoval@simon.rochester.edu. Postal: Simon School of
Business, University of Rochester, Rochester NY 14627. Phone: (585) 273 1645.1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions have been the subject of considerable research in ﬁnancial
economics. Yet, despite the substantial development of this literature, it is still un-
clear what is the relation between the timing and the terms of takeovers or what
are the determinants of returns to shareholders in control transactions. A feature
that the vast majority of takeover models share is that the timing of the takeover is
set exogenously — and in particular does not depend on the negotiated terms of the
takeover. The present paper develops an equilibrium framework for the joint deter-
mination of the timing and the terms of takeovers in the presence of competition and
imperfect information. This framework is then used to derive implications regarding
returns to stockholders in takeover deals.
The model developed in the paper relies on two key ingredients. The ﬁrst in-
gredient is an analogy between takeover opportunities and exchange options. This
analogy recognizes that takeover deals typically present participants in the deal with
an option to exchange one asset (the shares in the initial ﬁrm) for another (shares in
the new ﬁrm or some cash). As shown in the paper, this ﬁr s ti n g r e d i e n ti ss u ﬃcient to
generate implications regarding the timing and the terms of takeovers. In particular,
these two dimensions of the takeover deal are the outcome of an option exercise game
in which each ﬁrm determines an exercise strategy for its exchange option, while tak-
i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h eo t h e rﬁrms’ exercise strategies (see also Grenadier (2002) and
Novy-Marx (2003)).
The second key ingredient of the model relates to the information set of investors.
While participating ﬁrms have complete information over the underlying parameters
of the model, outside investors have incomplete information. However, these investors
can update their beliefs by observing the behavior of participating ﬁrms. This learning
process implies that outside investors can anticipate the timing and terms of the
takeover to some extent. As a result, the stock market valuations of participating
ﬁrms reﬂect the fraction of the takeover surplus that can be captured by public
information. This process also implies that as the takeover becomes more likely, a
larger fraction of the takeover surplus gets incorporated in the stock market valuations
of participating ﬁrms, thereby inducing a pre-bid runup in stock prices. The paper
also demonstrates that in equilibrium part of the uncertainty remains unresolved until
the announcement of the takeover. Therefore, the model generates abnormal returns
to stockholders around takeover announcements.
1The derivation of the results in the paper proceeds in two steps. The ﬁrst step
determines the equilibrium restructuring strategy as the solution to an option exercise
game between bidding and target shareholders. The second step characterizes the im-
plications of the equilibrium for abnormal returns around takeover announcements.
The model generates implications that are consistent with the available empirical
evidence and yields a number of new predictions. Notably, the model predicts that
(1) abnormal returns to target shareholders should be larger than returns to bidding
shareholders; (2) abnormal returns to bidding shareholders can be negative if there
is competition for the acquisition of the target; (3) the probability of negative abnor-
mal returns increases with dispersion of beliefs regarding the synergy created by the
takeover; (4) abnormal returns to stockholders increase with the volatility of stock
returns and decrease with the correlation between the returns of merging ﬁrms; (5)
the sensitivity to the return characteristics of merging ﬁrms is greater for abnormal
returns to target shareholders; and (6) competition speeds up the acquisition process
and decreases returns to bidding shareholders.
One important prediction of the model is that combined returns to stockholders
should be positive since takeovers create wealth in the short run. In that respect our
model diﬀers from the hubris hypothesis developed by Roll (1986), which predicts
that acquisitions announcements should have a zero combined abnormal return since
acquisitions just result in a wealth transfer between bidding and target stockholders.
It also diﬀers from the free cash ﬂow hypothesis of Jensen (1986), which predicts that
combined returns should be negative. Importantly, our model also allows us to relate
returns to stockholders to the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the characteristics
of stock returns. These additional predictions are unique to our model.
The analysis in the present paper relates to several articles in the literature. Mar-
grabe (1978) is the ﬁrst to analyze takeovers as exchange options. In his model, the
takeover involves a zero-sum game and timing is exogenous. Shleifer and Vishny
(2003) also consider a zero-sum game (in the long run) with exogenous timing. In
their framework, outside investors do not reﬂect the potential surplus associated with
the takeover in the stock market valuations of participating ﬁrms. Therefore, the
announcement of a takeover generates abnormal announcement returns. The present
paper extends these models in several important dimensions. First, the timing and
the terms of the takeover are determined endogenously as the solution to an option
exercise game. Second, the model incorporates both imperfect information and learn-
2ing, thereby generating both a pre-bid runup in stock prices and abnormal returns
to bidding and target shareholders around the takeover announcement. Finally, we
examine the impact of competition on the timing and terms of the takeover.
The paper that is most closely related to the present analysis is Lambrecht (2004).
Lambrecht also analyzes takeovers using a real options setting with endogenous tim-
ing. One essential diﬀerence between the two papers is that his analysis relies on
a strong form of market eﬃciency. This implies that in his model the price of the
companies moves smoothly to the post merger value and there are no abnormal stock
returns on the announcement of the takeover. Another important point of departure
is that we examine the impact of competition on the timing and terms of takeovers.
As shown in the paper, this feature is essential in generating negative announcement
returns to the bidder. Finally, we construct a two factor model that allows for diﬀer-
ent degrees of correlation between the bidder and the target stock returns, whereas
Lambrecht considers a one factor model that mostly applies to horizontal mergers.
Thus our paper as extends and complements the results derived in Lambrecht (2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
of takeovers. Section 3 analyzes the dynamics of mergers when there exists a unique
bidder. Section 4 introduces competition for the target. Section 5 concludes.
2 A reduced-form model of takeovers
This section presents the basic model and derives preliminary results in a static
framework. Equilibrium restructuring strategies for the one-bidder case are derived in
section 3. We introduce competition among several bidders in section 4. Throughout
the analysis, agents are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate r is constant.
Consider two ﬁrms with capital stocks K and Q and stock market valuations per
unit of capital B and T. Suppose that the stock market valuation of each ﬁrm has
two components. First, it includes the present value of the cash ﬂows generated by
their core businesses, denoted by X and Y . Second, it incorporates the potential
surplus associated with a control transaction, denoted by G.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eh a v e
B = X + GB (X,Y), and T = Y + GT (X,Y), (1)
where X and Y are stochastic processes with dynamics deﬁned below.
3At any time t>0, these two ﬁrms can negotiate a takeover deal. We follow
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) by assuming that, after the takeover, the value of equity
per unit of capital is a linear combination of pre-takeover values. In particular, the
post-takeover value of the ﬁrm is given by:
V (X,Y)=( K + Q)[(θ + α + α(ω − 1))X +( 1− θ − α)Y ], (2)
where θ = K/(K + Q) and (α,ω) ∈ R2
++. As will become clear below, the takeover
gain increases with α. In addition, B and T are respectively the bidding ﬁrm and
the target ﬁrm when α is positive, which is the case that we consider in the paper.
Thereafter, we assume that α is observable to all investors. By contrast, ω is only
observable to the managers of participating ﬁrms.1 Other market participants do not
know this value and assume that it is a random variable. Because insider trading
laws (and possibly wealth constraints) prohibit managers from trading on their inside
information, we consider that managers do not sell or buy their own stock to restore
eﬃcient pricing.
At the time of the takeover, the takeover surplus equals the value of the combined
ﬁrm minus the sum of the market values of the two ﬁrms prior to the takeover. After
simpliﬁcations, this combined surplus can be expressed as:2
G
C (X,Y)=( K + Q)α(ωX − Y ). (3)
Equation (3) suggests that acquiring ﬁrms are better performers (X>Y) and that the
restructuring will result in a more eﬃcient allocation of resources. This speciﬁcation
1In the paper, shareholders of both bidder and target ﬁrms are uninformed, but the managers
of those ﬁrms are informed. Thus, the stock price reﬂects the information set of the uninformed
shareholders. Shareholders decide to accept or reject takeover bids based on the informed manager’s
recommendation. Thus, when managers recommend a takeover, information is revealed and the
stock price reacts. But an outsider does not learn anything new simply by buying shares.
2In the numerical examples below, we will assume that the true value of ω is ω =1 . Because
the managers know that the true value of ω, it does not matter whether we multiply the bidder
valuation or the target valuation by the factor ω. Notably, we could assume instead that ﬁrm value
satisﬁes
V (X,Y)=( K + Q)[(θ + α)X +( 1− θ − α − α(ω − 1))Y ]
so that the combined gain is given by
GC (X,Y)=( K + Q)α(X − ωY ).
This speciﬁcation (with ω in front of the bidder valuation X) has been chosen because it allows us
to describe in a simple fashion bidder heterogeneity when we introduce competition for the target.
4is consistent with the fact that acquirers generally have higher Tobin’s q than their
target companies (see Andrade and Staﬀord (2004)).
The restructuring strategy selected by the participants to the deal typically de-
pends on the combined takeover surplus as well as its allocation between participants.
Suppose that the takeover agreement speciﬁes that a fraction ξ of the new ﬁrm ac-
crues to bidding shareholders after the takeover. (The allocation of the surplus is
determined endogenously below.) Such a restructuring opportunity presents bidding
shareholders with an option to exchange their initial shares for a fraction ξ of the
shares of the combined ﬁrm. It also implies that the surplus that bidding sharehold-
ers extract from the restructuring satisﬁes ξV (X,Y) − KX or
G
B (X,Y)=ξG
C (X,Y) − (1 − ξ)KX + ξQY, (4)
whereas the surplus accruing to target shareholders is given by
G
T (X,Y)=( 1− ξ)G
C (X,Y)+( 1− ξ)KX − ξQY. (5)
Equation (4) shows that the gain to the bidding ﬁrm reﬂects the combined takeover
s u r p l u sa sw e l la st h ef r a c t i o n( ξ)o ft h et a r g e tﬁrm that is transferred to bidding
shareholders and the fraction (1−ξ) of the bidding ﬁrm that is transferred to target
shareholders. A similar interpretation applies to (5).
The above characterization shows that the combined takeover surplus and its
sharing among participants depend on the size of the bidding and target ﬁrms, the
synergy parameter α, and the relative market valuations of the core business of the
two ﬁrms. The optimality of the decision to enter the takeover deal also depends
on other dimensions of the ﬁrms’ environment such as ongoing uncertainty or the
ﬁrms’ ability to reverse their decisions. Below, we assume that the takeover decision
is irreversible. In addition, we consider that ﬁrms face two sources of uncertainty.
The ﬁrst source of uncertainty relates to the cash ﬂows from the core businesses
of the two ﬁrms. In particular, we assume that the present value of these cash ﬂows
is observable and governed by the stochastic diﬀerential equations:3
dA(t)=µAA(t)dt + σAA(t)dWA (t),A = X,Y, (6)
3This is similar to assuming that cash ﬂows are observable and governed by Geometric Brownian
motions with starting values (r − µX)X (0) and (r − µY )Y (0).
5where µA <rand σA > 0 are constant parameters and WX and WY are standard
Brownian motions on (Ω,F,P). These equations imply that the growth rate of core
business valuations is normally distributed with mean µA∆t and variance σ2
A∆t over
time interval ∆t. In addition, we presume that the correlation coeﬃcient between the
two sources of uncertainty WX and WY is constant, equal to ρ.
The second source of uncertainty relates to the parameter ω that determines the
magnitude of the takeover surplus. As discussed above, we consider that outside
investors cannot observe this parameter. However, they can learn about this para-
meter by observing the behavior of the two ﬁrms. Notably, we show below that,
for each ω, the value maximizing policy is to invest when the process (R(t))t≥0 ≡
(X (t)/Y (t))t≥0 ﬁrst crosses a threshold R∗ (ω). At the time of the restructuring,
market participants can observe the current value of the process (R(t))t≥0 and infer
the value of the parameter ω using the mapping ω 7→ R∗ (ω). Before then, the market
learns about the value created by the takeover by observing the path of (R(t))t≥0.
Notably, when the process (R(t))t≥0 reaches a new peak and the ﬁrm does not in-
vest, the market revises its beliefs regarding the true value of ω. In addition, unless
ω = ωmin (where ωmin is the lowest possible value for ω), part of the uncertainty re-
mains unresolved until the announcement of the takeover. Thus, the model generates
abnormal returns around takeover announcements.
3 Mergers with a single bidder
3.1 Derivation of the equilibrium
The analysis in section 2 indicates that takeovers present participants to the deal
with an option to exchange one asset — their shares in the initial ﬁrm — for another —
a fraction of the shares of the combined ﬁrm. Moreover, for any given restructuring
policy, the takeover surplus depends on the synergy parameters ω and α and the
relative valuations of the bidding and target ﬁrms’ core businesses. Because ω and
α are presumed to be constant, the value-maximizing restructuring policy can be
characterized by deﬁning a function π(X) that represents, for every value of Y ,a
value for X a b o v ew h i c ht h et w oﬁrms should merge. The value of the option to
merge, denoted by O(X,Y), is thus a function of the contemporaneous values of X
and Y and the value-maximizing restructuring policy.
6The analogy between takeover opportunities and exchange options suggests that
the timing of takeover deals is determined by the restructuring strategy that maxi-
mizes the value of the exchange option. But, when analyzing the timing of mergers,
it is also important to recognize that each participant has the opportunity to enter
in the restructuring agreement and has to determine an exercise strategy for its ex-
change option. This exercise strategy depends on the combined surplus associated
with the restructuring and its sharing between participants. Thus, the timing of the
restructuring results from a strategic equilibrium in which each ﬁrm determines an
optimal strategy, while taking into account the other ﬁrm’s exercise strategy.
Consider ﬁrst the exercise strategy of the bidder. Using standard arguments, it
is possible to show that the value of the bidder’s restructuring option, denoted by
























where for any value-function H, Hx (resp. Hxx)d e n o t e st h eﬁrst order (resp. second
order) partial derivative of H with respect to x. The right hand side of equation (7)
represents the required rate of return on the option to merge. The left hand side is
equal to the expected return on this option due to changes in the values of the state
variables X and Y .




X=πB(Y ) = ξV (X,Y)|X=πB(Y ) − Kπ










X=πB(Y ) = ξVY (X,Y)|X=πB(Y ) . (10)
The value-matching condition (8) imposes an equality between the value of the re-
structuring option and the payoﬀ of the option upon exercise. Thus, the value of the
restructuring option equals, at the time of the takeover, the surplus bidding share-
holders extract from the restructuring. The smooth-pasting conditions (9) and (10)
ensure that the restructuring occurs along the optimal path by requiring a continuity
of the slopes at the trigger threshold. An additional boundary condition is given by
requiring that, as the ratio of the two stock prices decreases, the ratio of option value






7Equation (8) reveals that the payoﬀ of the restructuring option is linear in X
and Y . Thus, the bidder’s exercise strategy can be described using the ratio of these
two state variables: R ≡ X/Y . In addition, the time-homogeneity of the problem
allows us to conclude that the optimal restructuring policy is described by a constant
threshold R∗ at (and above) which it will be optimal to merge. The appendix provides
a derivation of the value of the bidder’s restructuring option. This value satisﬁes:
O













ξ [(K + Q)α − Q]
ξ [K + αω(K + Q)] − K
. (13)










β (β − 1) + (µX − µY)β − r =0 . (14)
Importantly, because R is deﬁned on R++, (K + Q)α ≥ Q is a necessary condition
for bidding shareholders to participate in the deal. (We show below that this para-
metric restriction disappears with competition among bidders.) In addition, when





−K [(K + Q)α − Q]
[ξ (K + αω(K + Q)) − K]
2 ≤ 0. (15)
This inequality shows that the greater the fraction of the surplus that bidding share-
holders extract from the restructuring, the greater their incentives to participate in
the deal. The inequality also highlights one essential diﬀerence between the present
model and traditional models of takeovers such as Grossman and Hart (1980). In
traditional models, the “timing” dimension of this investment decision is typically
overlooked and the logical conclusion of the analysis is that it is optimal for target
shareholders to hold up the bidder until all the improvement in value is paid to them.
Within the present model, the timing of the oﬀer depends on the negotiated terms
of the oﬀer and hence, when determining these terms, shareholders have to make a
trade-oﬀ between a greater surplus later or a lower surplus now.
The exercise strategy of the target can be derived in a similar fashion. The value
of the option to merge for the target is given by
O













ξQ +( 1− ξ)α(K + Q)
(1 − ξ)[(K + Q)αω + K]
. (17)
The above set of equations can be interpreted as follows. Equations (12) and
(15) give the value of the option to merge for the bidder and the target respectively.
The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h e s ee q u a t i o n sa c c o u n t sf o rt h es u r p l u s
associated with the takeover. The second term represents the present value of one
dollar contingent on the restructuring. Thus, this second term reﬂects both the
probability that the takeover occurs and the timing of the takeover. Equations (13)
and (17) give the restructuring thresholds selected by the bidder and the target. The
second term on the right hand side of these equations gives the ratio of the stock prices
R above which the restructuring generates a positive surplus (for a given sharing rule
for the value of the reorganized ﬁrm). Finally, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side
of equations (13) and (17) captures the “option value” associated with uncertainty.
The above developments demonstrate that, for any given sharing rule, each ﬁrm
can determine the restructuring policy that maximizes the surplus it extracts from
the takeover. Given the properties of the combined surplus, the optimal exercise
policies take the form of trigger policies described by equations (13) and (17). In
equilibrium, the negotiated outcome of the merger satisﬁes the constraint R∗
B = R∗
T,
which determines the allocation of the surplus between ﬁrms. The following results.
Proposition 1 The value-maximizing restructuring policy for participating ﬁrms is











Proposition 1 highlights several interesting features of merger agreements. First,
because the takeover surplus increases with ω, the threshold R∗ decreases with ω.
(The dependency of R∗ on ω implies that there is learning in equilibrium.) This in
turn implies that the likelihood of a control transaction over a given time interval
9[0,T] increases with ω.4 Consider for example an environment in which X/Y =2 ,
the risk-free interest rate is r =0 .1, the drifts of cash ﬂows from the core business
valuations are µX =0 .03 and µY =0 .01, the volatility of core business valuations
are σX = σY =0 .2, and the correlation coeﬃcient between core business valuations
ρ =0 .25. When the synergy of the restructuring increases from ω =1to ω =1 .25,
the likelihood of a takeover over a ﬁve-year period increases from 49.1% to 86%.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Second, the equilibrium restructuring threshold R∗ depends on the growth rate
and volatility of cash ﬂows from the ﬁrms’ core businesses as well as the degree of
consolidation of the merger (correlation coeﬃcient). In particular, holding their co-
variance ﬁxed, a greater variance for the changes in X and Y implies more uncertainty
over their ratio, and hence an increased incentive to wait. Holding their variances
ﬁxed, a greater covariance between the changes in X and Y implies less uncertainty
over their ratio, and hence a reduced incentive to wait. These eﬀects are depicted
in Figure 1, which plots the restructuring threshold as a function of the growth rate
and volatility of participating ﬁrms’ core business valuations, and the correlation
coeﬃcient between these valuations.
3.2 Imperfect information and announcement returns
We now turn to the implications of the model for abnormal announcement returns to
stockholders in takeover deals. These returns are equal to the unexpected component
of the surplus accruing to shareholders divided by equity value at the time of the
takeover. Within the present model, this unexpected component arises because mar-
ket participants have incomplete information regarding the takeover surplus. How-
ever, at the time of the announcement, this uncertainty is resolved by observing the
value of the trigger threshold R∗ (ω) and the equilibrium allocation of the surplus ξ.5


































/σR and N is the Standard Normal cumulative distribution function.
5This is similar in spirit to the analysis in Grenadier (1999) and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003)
where agents infer the private information of other agents through their observed exercise strategies.





R∗ (β − 1)
. (20)
This equation indicates that there exists a negative, monotonic relation between the
restructuring point and the identiﬁed synergy. Thus, by observing the behavior of
the two ﬁrms — and in particular whether these two ﬁrms exercise their option when
R reaches a new peak — the market can update its beliefs regarding the value of ω.
To determine the implications of the model for abnormal returns, we assume
that the prior distribution of ω is uniform with sample space {1 − σω,1,1+σω}
so that each outcome can occur with equal probability. This assumption implies
that its posterior distribution at any time t is also uniform. Denote by τ the time





∗ (1 + σω)=
β
(1 + σω)(β − 1)
(so that investors know that ω 6=1+σω) and we can write the value of the bidding






B (R(τ−),1;1) + O
B (R(τ−),1;1 − σω)
¤
, (21)
where OB (R,1;x) is the value of the bidder’s option to merge conditional on ω = x.
The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 2 1 )r e p r e s e n t st h ev a l u eo ft h e
bidding ﬁrm core business. The second term reﬂects the potential gain associated
w i t hat a k e o v e rf o rb i d d i n gs h a r e h o l d e r s .














for all t ≤ τ,w h e r eR∗ is deﬁned in Proposition 1. This inequality implies positive
abnormal announcement stock returns to bidding shareholders in the basic model. In









11Figure 2 plots abnormal announcement returns as a function of the growth rate
and volatility of participating ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows, and the degree of consolidation of
the merger (correlation coeﬃcient). In this ﬁgure, the solid line represents abnormal
returns to bidding shareholders. The dashed line represents abnormal returns to
target shareholders.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Because the timing of the merger depends on the growth rate and volatility of the
ﬁrms’ core business valuations and the degree of consolidation of the merger, so do
abnormal returns to shareholders. In particular, the model predicts that returns to
bidding and target shareholders should (1) decrease with the degree of consolidation of
the merger and the growth rate of the target’s core business valuation and (2) increase
with volatility and the growth rate of the bidder’s core business valuation. These
eﬀects are depicted in Figure 2, which also shows that abnormal returns to target
shareholders typically exceed abnormal returns to bidding shareholders (the Appendix
shows that it is always the case when the bidding ﬁrm is larger than the target or
K ≥ Q). Finally, it should be noted that without competition, returns to bidding
shareholders always are positive, which is inconsistent with the available evidence.
We show below that competition and imperfect information can generate negative
abnormal announcement returns, even when agents have rational expectations.
3.3 Central-planning formulation
One interesting feature of the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is that it can be
formulated as a surplus-maximization problem for a central planner. The objective
of the planner is to determine the restructuring policy that maximizes the combined
surplus:
G
C (X,Y)=( K + Q)α(ωX − Y ). (24)
Using similar arguments as above, it is possible to show that the surplus-maximizing
policy is identical to the restructuring policy described in Proposition 1 (see the
Appendix). Thus, the restructuring policy associated with the merger coincides with
the one that would be chosen by a surplus-maximizing planner.6
6This suggests that the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 can be derived by ﬁrst determining
a sharing rule for the takeover surplus and then selecting the timing that maximizes this surplus.
The only renegotiation-proof allocation under that scenario is the one described in Proposition 1.
124 Introducing competition
4.1 Competition and the timing of takeovers
In this section, we extend the analysis by considering that two potential acquirers
that diﬀer in terms of synergy beneﬁt ω can compete for the target.7 Introducing
competition among multiple bidders impacts the mechanism determining the equi-
librium timing and terms of the takeover. One essential diﬀerence with the case of
a single bidder is the decay in the bidders’ bargaining power due to competition.
Competition among bidders puts the target in an advantageous position and allows
target shareholders to extract a higher premium from the bidding ﬁrms.
To determine the timing and terms of the takeover, we ﬁr s te x a m i n et h eo p t i -
mization problem of bidding shareholders. Once the takeover contest is initiated,
both bidders submit their bids to the target in the form of the fraction of the new
ﬁrm’s equity to be owned by target shareholders upon the takeover consummation.
The maximum value of that fraction, or the maximum price that a bidder is willing
to pay to acquire the target, makes the bidder indiﬀerent between winning and losing
the takeover contest. The bidder never places a bid in excess of that value, since
it would be better oﬀ by losing the contest and letting the other bidder acquire the
target. Denote by Ki the size of bidder i and assume that both bidders belong to the
same industry so that their cash ﬂows are driven by the same process X.8 Then the
breakeven stake of bidder i is the solution to




Assume that we adopt a Nash equilibrium and denote by ξi the ownership share
that bidder i would obtain if it were the only bidder. Then the reaction function of
bidder 1 can be deﬁned as follows
1. Suppose that V (X,Y;ω1) >V(X,Y;ω2). Then bidder 1 is the stronger of the
two and wins the takeover contest. Depending on the current value of the ratio
7In the Appendix, we examine the timing of takeovers when ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of α and ω.
8Extending the model to incorporate a third stochastic process (one for the target and one for
each bidder) would not add many new economic insights. Indeed, we already capture heterogeneity
by using a correlation coeﬃcient that is less than one between X and Y . Moreover, most of the
results in this section do not rely on the speciﬁc dynamics of the stochastic processes governing cash
ﬂows from asset in place so that having one or two processes would not change anything.
13of the stochastic processes R = X/Y and the asymmetry between the synergy
parameters ω1 and ω2, two diﬀerent scenarios are possible:
(a) The value associated with the equilibrium share oﬀered to target share-
holders is greater than the breakeven value of the weaker bidder:
(1 − ξbe2)V (X,Y;ω2) < (1 − ξ1)V (X,Y;ω1)
where ξ1 can be obtained by solving (13) for ξ1:
ξ1 =
K1R
R(K1 + αω1(K1 + Q)) −
β
β−1(α(K1 + Q) − Q)
In this case bidder 2 is too weak to matter, as it drops out from takeover
contests at bid values below that of the equilibrium bid of the stronger
bidder. Therefore the equilibrium terms of the takeover will be the same
as in the case of a single bidder.
(b) The value associated with the equilibrium share oﬀered to target share-
holders is lower than the breakeven value of the weaker bidder:
(1 − ξbe2)V (X,Y;ω2) > (1 − ξ1)V (X,Y;ω1)
Now bidder 1 can no longer ignore the presence of bidder 2. If bidder 1
oﬀers its equilibrium stake to target shareholders, just as in the case with
no competition, then bidder 2 has an incentive to outbid, as it will be
better oﬀ by winning the contest. This incentive disappears once the bid
value reaches the breakeven threshold of bidder 2. Therefore bidder 1 has
to keep an ownership stake in the combined ﬁrm such that the value to
the target of dealing with bidder 1 is not less than that of dealing with
bidder 2. Denote this stake by ξ1max. Then bidder 1 has no incentive to
keep a stake that is lower than ξ1max by any material amount. By oﬀering
1 − ξ1max+ ε bidder 1 is able to ward competition oﬀ, since any bid in
excess of 1−ξ1max makes bidder 2 strictly better oﬀ by dropping out from
the auction. Since ε can be made arbitrarily small, we do not take it into
consideration and the equilibrium share of the bidder is ξ1max.
2. Suppose that V (X,Y;ω2) >V(X,Y;ω1). Then bidder 2 is the stronger of
the two and wins the takeover contest. As above, two diﬀerent scenarios are
14possible depending on the current value of the ratio of the stochastic processes
R = X/Y and the asymmetry between bidder characteristics.
Suppose that V (X,Y;ωi) >V(X,Y;ωj). The above argument implies that when
there is competition, the winning bidder requires an ownership fraction that is no
higher (and possibly lower) than in the absence of competition. Thus the downward
sloping reaction function R(min(ξi,ξimax)) coincides (case a) or lies below (case b)
the reaction function under no competition. It follows that the intersection with the
target’s upward sloping reaction function RT (ξ) shifts to the left along the target’s
reaction function, i.e. occurs at a threshold value of R not higher (and possibly
lower) than in the case with one bidder. Denote by Rbej the ratio of core business
valuations for which the breakeven share of the loosing bidder (bidder j)i se q u a lt o
the equilibrium share of the target. This ratio solves the non-linear equation
ξimax =
(β − 1)R[(K + Q)αωi + K] − βα(K + Q)
(β − 1)R[(K + Q)αωi + K]+β [Q − α(K + Q)]
, (25)
where the right hand side of this equation has been obtained by solving (17) for ξT.
We then have the following result.9
Proposition 2 Competition for the target ﬁrm speeds up the takeover process and
erodes the ownership stake of bidding shareholders. When there is competition and
V (X,Y;ωi) >V(X,Y;ωj), the takeover takes place the ﬁrst time the ratio of core
business valuations (Rt)t≥0 =( Xt/Yt)t≥0 reaches the threshold R∗ deﬁned by
R
∗ =m i n[ Ri,R bej],
where R∗ = Ri deﬁned in (18) when the losing bidder is weak and R∗ = Rbej deﬁned
in (25) when the losing bidder is strong. Moreover, the share of the combined ﬁrm
accruing to the bidder is given by
ξ =m i n
∙







where the min function takes a value equal to its ﬁrst argument when competition
erodes the ownership share of bidding shareholders and a value equal to its second
argument otherwise.
9In the Appendix we show that when α1 6= α2, there exists a critical point R such that if
R<(>)R then bidder 2 (1) is stronger. Consequently, who wins the takeover depends on the value
of R at the start of the game. We thank the referee for suggesting this point to us.
15Figure 3 illustrates this result by providing the reaction functions of the bidder
and the target for diﬀerent parameter values. The dashed line represents the reaction
function of bidder 1 if there is no competition while the dotted line represents the
share in the combined entity corresponding to the breakeven value of the second
bidder. The reaction function of the target is provided by the solid line. In this ﬁgure
we presume that ω1 =1 . In addition, we have ω2 =0 .6 in 3a (weak second bidder)
and ω2 =0 .95 in 3b (strong second bidder).
Insert Figure 3 Here
Consistent with the above arguments, when the second bidder is too weak (as in
ﬁgure 3a), the equilibrium is unaﬀected by competition. However, when the second
bidder is suﬃciently strong (ﬁgure 3b), the winning bidder has to pay the value of the
breakeven share of bidder 2. This shifts its reaction curve downwards and speeds up
the takeover. For example, in ﬁgure 3b the takeover threshold drops from 2.72 to 2.45
and the probability of investment over a ﬁve year horizon increases from 49.1% to
65%. When the two bidders are identical, their breakeven values coincide and target
shareholders are able to extract the whole takeover surplus. In this case, the takeover
is always accelerated, since for any given R, the winning bidder has to oﬀer a higher
share to the target than it would absent competition.
4.2 Competition and announcement returns
As in section 3, abnormal announcement returns are equal to the unexpected compo-
nent of the surplus accruing to shareholders divided by equity value at the time of the
takeover. When there is competition for the target, this unexpected component arises
for two reasons. First, market participants have incomplete information regarding the
takeover surplus. Second, in the case of multiple bidders, market participants typi-
cally cannot identify the winning bidder before the takeover announcement. Thus, at
any date outside investors assign probability weights to each bidder being the winning
one. These probabilities are updated as new information arrives. At the time of the
takeover announcement, uncertainty is partially (or totally) resolved by observing the
value of the trigger threshold R∗ (ω) and the equilibrium bid.
To characterize abnormal returns in a simple fashion, we consider that K1 = K2 =
K and α1 = α2 = α. In addition, we presume that the prior beliefs of outside investors
are that the ωis are independent and uniformly distributed on {ωimin,ωiav,ωimax},
16i =1 ,2.10 As outside investors observe the investment behavior of participating
ﬁrms, they update their beliefs regarding the possible values of the ωis. At the time
of the takeover abnormal returns to shareholders typically depend on the remaining
uncertainty. Three cases are possible.
1. ω2max < ω1min. I nt h i sc a s e ,o u t s i d ei n v e s t o r sk n o wa tt h eb e g i n n i n gt h a t
the target will merge with bidder 1. However, the value of bidder 1’s option to
merge and the equilibrium takeover surplus are uncertain. Abnormal announce-
ment returns to bidder 1 can be either positive or negative, depending on the
dispersion of beliefs regarding the synergy value created in the takeover.
2. ω2max > ω1min and min(ξ1,ξ1max)=ξ1. In this case, the outcome of the
takeover contest is not known initially. By observing the behavior of the ﬁrms
before the takeover, investors may be able to infer the identity of the winning
bidder. At the time of the takeover, investors learn that bidder 1 is the winning
bidder as well as the value of the synergy parameter ω1. Again, abnormal
announcement returns to bidder 1 can be either positive or negative.
3. ω2max> ω1minand min(ξ1,ξ1max)=ξ1max.T h i sc a s ei ss i m i l a rt oc a s e2e x c e p t
that bidder 1 oﬀers a stake corresponding to the breakeven value of bidder 2.
A si nt h ec a s eo fas i n g l eb i d d e r ,w ed e n o t eb yτ t h et i m eo ft h et a k e o v e ra n -







The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h i se q u a t i o ni st h ev a l u eo ft h eb i d d e r ’ sc o r e
business. The second term represents the expected present value of the takeover sur-
plus. Since we assume a ﬁnite set of possible realizations for the pairs (ω1,ω2) and dif-
ferent pairs generally result in diﬀerent takeover thresholds, investors learn the values
10When ω is drawn from a probability distribution F (ω) with continuous probability density
function f (ω), outside investors update their beliefs about the distribution as follows:
f (ω|Rsup (t)) =
f (ω)
1 − f (ω(Rsup (t)))
, and F (ω|Rsup (t)) =
F (ω) − F (ω(Rsup (t)))
1 − F (ω(Rsup (t)))
,
where Rsup (t) ≡ sup0≤s≤t R(s) and ω(Rsup (t)) ≡ I [R∗ (ω)|R∗ (ω)=Rsup (t)],where I (.) inverts
R∗ (ω), meaning that I [R∗ (ω)] = ω for all ω. Assuming a “prior” support [ωmin,ωmax] for ω,t h e
“posterior” support of beliefs is given at any time t by [ωmin,min(ωmax,ω(Rsup (t)))].
17of both ω1 and ω2 by observing the takeover threshold. Therefore, E (ω1|ξ1max)=ω1
and the value of the share of bidder 1’s shareholders just after the takeover announce-
ment becomes:
B1(τ)=X [K + α(ω1 − ω2)(K + Q)]. (27)
Abnormal returns to bidding shareholders at the time of the takeover announcement
are then deﬁned as: ARB (τ)=( B (τ) − B (τ−))/B (τ−).
Using equations (26) and (27), we see that takeover deals can entail either positive
or negative returns to bidder 1. The sign of the returns depends on the diﬀerence
between true synergy parameters. For example, if the two bidders are identical,
uncertainty in market beliefs always generates negative abnormal returns around
announcements. Indeed, in this case a bidder’s option to merge is worthless in (27).
However, the market’s expectation of this option is positive in (26). In general, when
the diﬀerence in synergy parameters is small, so is the premium that accrues to
bidder 1 at the time of the takeover. If the uncertainty in market beliefs is high (high
ω2max− ω2min), then the market’s (conditional) expectation of the merger beneﬁts
might exceed its true value. Therefore, the market overestimates the beneﬁts of the
merger to bidder 1 and we observe negative abnormal returns to bidder 1 at the
takeover announcement.11 If the diﬀerence between ω1 and ω2 is large, then the
true value of bidder 1’s option to merge is higher than its expectation. In that case,
abnormal announcement returns to bidding shareholders are positive.
The model, therefore, predicts that with competition and imperfect information,
the sign (and the magnitude) of the abnormal returns to the winner of the takeover
contest depends on the degree of asymmetry between bidders. Low asymmetry im-
plies negative returns; high asymmetry implies positive returns. Obviously, abnormal
11For example, assume that σ1 =0 , σ2 > 0,a n dω2 − σ2 < ω2 < ω1 < ω2 + σ2. If by the time






OB (R(τ−),ω1,ω2)+OB (R(τ−),ω1,ω2 − σ2)
¤
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since the winning bidder pays the breakeven value corresponding to ω2 which is higher than the one
corresponding to ω2 − σ2.
18announcement returns also depend on the magnitude of uncertainty related to syn-
ergy parameters. Let σω2 be a measure of dispersion of investors’ beliefs about the
synergy gain of bidder 2 so that ω2min = ω2 − σω2 and ω2max = ω2 + σω2.F i g u r e4
plots abnormal announcement returns to bidding shareholders as a function of σω2
for diﬀerent values of ω1 and ω2.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
Consistent with the above discussion, ﬁgure 4a reveals that when the two bidders are
identical abnormal returns to bidder 1 are always negative. In this case the bidders
compete all the rents associated with the merger away. Moreover, high uncertainty
in beliefs about bidder 2, σω2, leads to a high magnitude of abnormal returns to
bidder 1. Figure 4b illustrates the following two additional points. First, as the
magnitude of the asymmetry between the bidders increases, abnormal announcement
returns increase and may become positive (for lower values of σω2). In addition,
these abnormal returns decrease with the dispersion of beliefs regarding the synergy
parameter of the weaker bidder and may become again negative as σω2 becomes larger.
Consider next returns to target shareholders. When the second bidder is too weak
to matter, the timing and terms of the takeover are not aﬀected by competition. As a
result, abnormal returns to target shareholders are similar to those derived in section
3. When competition erodes the bargaining power of bidding shareholders, the terms
of the takeover to target shareholders are improved. As a result their returns remain
positive and larger than abnormal returns to bidding shareholders. Moreover, and as
in the case of the single bidder, the reaction function of the target in Figure 3 increases
with the degree of consolidation of the merger and the growth rate of the target’s core
business valuation and decreases with volatility and the growth rate of the bidder’s
core business valuation.12 As a result, abnormal returns to target shareholders should
(1) decrease with the degree of consolidation of the merger and the growth rate of
the target’s core business valuation and (2) increase with volatility and the growth
rate of the bidder’s core business valuation.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
These results derived above are consistent with empirical evidence reported by
Schwert (2000) and Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001) regarding abnormal an-
12In the case of the weak second bidder, this eﬀect is augmented by a shift in the opposite direction
of the equilibrium reaction function ξ1 of bidding shareholders.
19nouncement returns. Notably, these studies document that returns to target share-
holders around the takeover announcement typically are positive whereas returns to
bidding shareholders typically are negative. Interestingly, the present model can gen-
erate returns that are consistent with the empirical evidence even though agents have
rational expectations. In particular, the analysis reveals that negative announce-
ment returns to bidding shareholders may simply arise because of the diﬃculty of
estimating the potential synergies generated by the control transaction. We show
that if beliefs are suﬃciently dispersed and the two potential bidders have similar
characteristics, returns will be negative. The additional implications of the model
regarding abnormal announcement returns are novel and provide further opportunity
for empirical research.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a dynamic model of takeovers that jointly determines the timing
and the terms of takeovers. For doing so, the model relies on an analogy between re-
structuring opportunities and exchange options. The analysis in the paper also recog-
nizes the role of the strategic interaction between participants to the deal and derives
equilibrium restructuring strategies by solving option exercise games between bidding
and target shareholders. The model incorporates imperfect information, learning and
competition and shows how all three ingredients interact to determine abnormal re-
turns to stockholders around takeover announcements.
The returns associated with the equilibrium restructuring strategies derived in the
paper are consistent with the empirical evidence. Speciﬁcally, the model predicts that
(1) returns to target shareholders should be larger than returns to bidding sharehold-
ers, (2) returns to bidding shareholders can be negative if there is competition for
the acquisition of the target and uncertainty regarding the synergy of the takeover,
and (3) competition among heterogenous ﬁrms aﬀects returns in takeover deals and
speeds up the acquisition process. In addition, the paper generates new predictions
relating abnormal returns to bidding and target shareholders to the drift, volatility
and correlation coeﬃcient of the bidder and the target stock returns.
20Appendix
A. Timing and terms of the merger
Denote the value of the bidder’s restructuring option by OB (X,Y).I nt h er e g i o nf o r
the two state variables where there is no takeover, the instantaneous change in the




























The equilibrium expected return on the restructuring option is r. Combining this





























X=πB(Y ) = ξV (X,Y)|X=πB(Y ) − Kπ










X=πB(Y ) = ξVY (X,Y)|X=πB(Y ) . (A.5)






The value function OB (X,Y) is linearly homogenous in X and Y .T h u s , t h e
optimal restructuring policy can be described using the ratio of the two stock prices:
R = X/Y . Also, the value of the restructuring option can be written as
O
B (X,Y)=YO






























21Substituting (A.7)-(A.12) in the partial diﬀerential equation (A.2) and boundary










R =( r − µY)O
B, (A.13)
with the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
O(R
∗)=ξV (R,1) − KR, (A.14)
OR (R
∗)=ξVR (R,1) − K, (A.15)




B (R)=0 . (A.16)





where A and B are positive constants and β and γ are respectively the positive and





Rφ(φ − 1) + µRφ − r + µj =0 . (A.18)
Condition (A.17) implies that B =0 . Conditions (A.15) and (A.16) can be written
AR
β = ξV (R,1) − KR, and βAR
β−1 = ξVR (R,1) − K. (A.19)
Rearranging these equations give:
A =( R
∗)




ξ [(K + Q)α − Q]
ξ [K + αω(K + Q)] − K
. (A.20)
B. Central-planning formulation
One interesting feature of the Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is that
it can be formulated as a surplus-maximization problem for a central planner. The
objective of the planner is to determine the restructuring policy that maximizes the
combined surplus GC (X,Y). The value of the restructuring option for the central





























X=πB(Y ) = G
C (X,Y)
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X=πP(Y ) , (B.4)






Using the same change of numéraire as above yields a restructuring policy identical
to that described in Proposition 1.
C. Abnormal returns
In the absence of competition, abnormal returns to bidding shareholders at the time




















(1−σω)Q+K (1 − σω)
β. (C.2)
Similarly, abnormal returns to target shareholders at the time of the takeover














(1−σω)Q+K (1 − σω)
β




(1−σ)Q+K (1 − σω)
β. (C.4)
Using these expressions, it is immediate to see that ART (τ) >A R B (τ) when K ≥ Q.
23D. Timing of takeovers when α1 6= α2
Suppose α1 6= α2. Then there exists a critical point R such that if R<(>)R then
bidder 2 (1) is stronger. Consequently, who wins the takeover depends on the value of
R at the start of the game. In particular, assume that K1 = K2, α1 > α2 and ω1 < ω2.
Under these assumptions, we have R∗
2 = β/[ω2 (β − 1)] < β/[ω1 (β − 1)] = R∗
1.





We then have the two following cases:
1. Suppose that the starting value of the ratio of core business valuations is lower
than R.I fR∗
2 < R, and bidder 1 is weak, then bidder 2 wins the takeover and
competition does not aﬀect the timing or the terms of takeovers. In particular,
the takeover occurs the ﬁrst time R reaches R∗
2. Otherwise competition aﬀects
the timing and terms of takeovers. Speciﬁcally, the takeover takes place the ﬁrst
time (Rt)t≥0 reaches the threshold Rbe1 conditional on Rbe1 < R,w h e r eRbe1 is
the ratio of core business valuations for which the breakeven share of bidder 1
is equal to the equilibrium share of the target.
2. Suppose instead that the starting value of the ratio of core business valuations
is larger than R. If the takeover happens for R>R, then it takes place the ﬁrst
time (Rt)t≥0 reaches the threshold R∗ =m i n[ R∗
1,R be2,],w h e r eRbe2 is the ratio
of core business valuations for which the breakeven share of bidder 2 is equal
to the equilibrium share of the target. Int h i se q u a t i o nt h em i nf u n c t i o nt a k e s
av a l u ee q u a lt oi t sﬁrst argument when the losing bidder is weak and a value
equal to its second argument when the losing bidder is strong. In the latter case,
competition speeds up the takeover process and erodes the ownership stake of
bidding shareholders.
T h ea b o v ea r g u m e n ts h o w st h a tw h e nα1 6= α2 and min[R∗
2,R be1] < R,t a k e o v e r s
happen in “up” as well as “down” states, but they are undertaken by diﬀerent types
of ﬁrms. In the two diﬀerent regions of exercise, each ﬁrm decides on the optimal
timing, subject to the threat of competition and considering the premium that is
demanded by the target.
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25T a b l e1 :I n p u tp a r a m e t e rv a l u e sf o rt h eb a s ec a s ee n v i r o n m e n t . This table
outlines the parameter values used in the based case environment.
Parameter Value
risk free interest rate r =0 .05
drift rates µB =0 .03 and µT =0 .01
diﬀusion coeﬃcients σB = σT =0 .2
correlation coeﬃcient ρ =0 .5
ﬁrm size K = Q =1
Figure 1: Restructuring threshold in merger agreements. Figure 1 plots the
selected restructuring threshold in merger agreements as a function of the growth rate
and volatility of cash ﬂows from the core businesses of the two ﬁrms and the correlation
coeﬃcient between changes in these cash ﬂows. Input parameter values are set as in the
base case environment.
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26Figure 2: Abnormal returns in merger announcements. Figure 2 plots ab-
normal returns to shareholders in merger agreements as a function of the growth rate and
volatility of cash ﬂows from the core businesses of the two ﬁrms and the correlation coef-
ﬁcient between changes in these cash ﬂows. Input parameter values are set as in the base
case environment. In this ﬁgure, the solid line represents returns to bidding shareholders.
The dashed line represents returns to target shareholders.
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27Figure 3: Reaction function of bidding and target shareholders. Figure 3
plots the reaction function of bidding and target shareholders when there is competition
among bidders. Input parameter values are set as in the base case. The dashed line
represents the reaction function of bidder 1 if there is no competition while the dotted line
represents the share in the combined entity corresponding to the breakeven value of the
second bidder. The reaction function of the target is provided by the solid line. In this
ﬁgure we presume that ω1=1 . In addition, we have ω2=0 .6 in 3a (weak second bidder)
and ω2=0 .95 in 3b (strong second bidder).






























Figure 3a: Weak second bidder






























Figure 3b: Strong second bidder
28Figure 4: Abnormal announcement returns to bidding shareholders. Fig-
ure 4 plots abnormal announcement returns to the winning bidder as a function of the
dispersion of beliefs about the synergy parameter of bidder 2, σω2 for the standard set of
input parameters. The synergy parameter of the stronger bidder is set equal to ω1=1
and its volatility is set equal to σω2=0 .1. The synergy parameter of the weaker bidder is
given by ω2=1in Figure 4a so that abnormal returns are always negative. The synergy
parameter of the weaker bidder is given by ω2=0 .95 (solid line) or ω2=0 .9 (dashed line)
in Figure 4b so that abnormal returns can be either positive (low dispersion of beliefs) or
negative (high dispersion of beliefs).
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Figure 4a: Abnormal returns when ω1 = ω2
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Figure 4b: Abnormal returns when ω1 6= ω2
29Figure 5: Abnormal returns to target shareholders around merger an-
nouncements. Figure 5 plots abnormal returns to target shareholders around merger
announcements. The synergy parameter of the stronger bidder is set equal to ω1=1and
its volatility is set equal to σω1=0 .1. The synergy parameter of the weaker bidder is given
by ω2=0 .95 and its volatility is set equal to σω2=0 .2, so that abnormal returns to bidding
shareholders are negative.
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Lausanne, CPER & FAME; October 2004 
    
N° 116  The Price Impact and Survival of Irrational Traders - Winner of the 2004 FAME Research Prize 
Leonid KOGAN, Sloan School of Management, MIT and  NBER;  Stephen ROSS, Sloan School of Management, 
MIT and  NBER; Jiang WANG, Sloan School of Management, MIT, CCFR and  NBER ; Mark WESTERFIELD, the 
Economics Department, MIT; August 2004 
  
 
   
 
 
International Center FAME - Partner Institutions 
 
 
The University of Geneva 
The University of Geneva, originally known as the Academy of Geneva, was founded in 1559 by Jean 
Calvin and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute 
of architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic 
and cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, 
and international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; 
arts; social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-
sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 
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